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The history of the relation between the law, norm, or rule on the one hand and what 
forms an exception to that rule on the other is complex and multifaceted.1 In the most 
general terms, one could posit that the exception is that which escapes from the rule. 
Thus, confronted with the strangeness of Michael K, his noncommunicativeness, his odd 
combination of meekness and intransigence, the medical ofﬁcer in J. M. Coetzeeʼs Life 
and Times of Michael K assigns K a place “above and beneath classiﬁcation” [Coetzee 
151]. Michael K is at once too large and too small to ﬁt into the administrative and 
humanitarian categories that pertain at the prisoner camp. He appears to the medical of-
ﬁcer—whose good intentions and patient, selﬂess interest in K cannot be doubted—as a 
recalcitrant, nonidentiﬁable object that ﬂirts with dehumanization. To put it in Batailleʼs 
terms, Michael K is formless (informe), and his existence can, by mere virtue of that fact, 
be called scandalous.2
 Let us take a closer look at the expression “above and beneath classiﬁcation.” We can 
note that (1) it names something that situates itself on the outside of any classiﬁcation; 
(2) this something must have a paradoxical status, since it is at once above and beneath 
classiﬁcation; (3) the nonclassiﬁable is regarded as such from a classifying perspective. 
Although the latter point may sound tautological, it nonetheless touches upon one of the 
most difﬁcult dimensions of the exception: if the exception is always an exception to the 
rule, how can it exist otherwise than by virtue of that rule? how can it be more than just 
the ruleʼs negative? But if the exception radically breaks away from the rule, then how 
is it possible for that rule to identify the exception and recognize it as such? This crucial 
problem has formed the basis for reﬂection on the relation between rule and exception. 
Freud, for instance, saw the exception (crime) as constitutive of social ties and the social 
order. Lacan needed a special topology to show the extimate character of what is at once 
inside and outside the symbolic order [Lacan, Miller]. Religious ways of thinking could 
be said to have located the exception as transcendent to any human order. For Badiou, 
the secularization of the inﬁnite cannot be thought apart from an immanent, rather than 
transcendent, event that is disruptive of all order. In Derridaʼs subtle analyses, the origi-
nary supplement appears as both constitutive and deconstructive. Agamben regards the 
exception as having become the political rule. These interpretative frameworks, in spite 
of some deep distinctions, all show not only that the rule cannot do without the excep-
tion, but that the exception is just as dependent on the rule. Even when the exception is 
regarded as a kind of pure, ruleless being-as-such, the rule is at the very least conceptually 
indispensable for this pure, mere being to be thinkable in the ﬁrst place. In brief, however 
much one may want, for political or other reasons, to assign the exception a central place 
at the expense of the rule, that rule remains inescapable.
 Nonetheless, the inevitability of the rule should not lead us to conclude that it is also 
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immutable, nor that we should adopt a conservatism that accepts the rule as a repressive 
normativity or as an inclusive and exclusive apparatus of judgment. That this is as impos-
sible as it is undesirable is suggested by what we indicated under the second item: the 
exception is both above and beneath. The exception is the paradoxical given of that which 
at once escapes from existing categories and lacks all identity in that escape. The problem 
that Michael K and Bartleby, the second ﬁgure of exception we consider in this essay, 
present for the rule resides not just in the recalcitrance that allows them to show up the 
limits of the rule, but also in the doubling with which this goes hand in hand. Michael K 
and Bartleby are as pliant as they are obdurate, show great loyalty even as they insist on 
an antisocial faithlessness, stick to their guns in an infuriating manner, yet are susceptible 
to the accident of a chance encounter. To sum up, they lack any clear “self”; they are at 
once something and nothing, a fact that precisely enables them to appear to us as highly 
singular. 
 Within the scope of this essay we can only indicate in summary fashion the general 
problem of the interrelation of rule and exception. We do not aim to solve this problem 
or even to give it a new turn. What we propose to do is concentrate on how this problem 
affects literature and in particular how literature is read. In such a context the rule goes 
by the name of “allegorical reading” and the exception by that of “singularity.” Our thesis 
is that the desire to do justice to the singularity encountered in the literary text cannot 
be met by an outdated humanism that regards literature as a vessel through which moral 
values are passed on from author to reader, nor by a more contemporary plea that the 
reader identify with the multiplicity of perspectives or the ﬂesh-and-blood “others” that 
literature presents to them. In our view, it is rather that, by participating in the world 
staged in the text, readers not so much identify with a perspective that was unfamiliar 
to them before but experience a condition divorced from any perspective, or, to put this 
more cautiously, undergo a singular perspective that is in the process of being formed. 
 As we will go on to show in more detail, some attempts to combine a respect for 
the singular with a critique of what is qualiﬁed as allegorical result in a weak (and even 
suspect) indication of the universally human that literature supposedly gives access to. 
And what else to expect when one tries to read the literary text for that which is located 
beyond any speciﬁc feature or allegorical meaning? As we see it, it should be possible to 
do justice to the singular without throwing the allegorical overboard, since the allegori-
cal is quite simply unavoidable. All literature, logically speaking, starts with a metaphor. 
This is what Lacan calls the function of the beautiful: the beautiful is, next to the good, 
a signiﬁer that creates a necessary distance between word and thing, between what is 
represented and what remains absent in that representation [Lacan 00]. The metaphorical 
functioning of the beautiful, in this case literature, necessarily produces an allegorical 
impulse in the beholder or reader. A signiﬁer provokes the question of what it could pos-
sibly refer to, even if the question remains unanswered—even if it is exactly the function 
of the beautiful to provoke this question and yet ensure that it be left unanswered or in 
suspension. Then again, literature does not exist purely by the grace of a metaphorical op-
eration that creates and maintains a distance between beauty and what that beauty veils. A 
crucial dimension of literatureʼs singularity is that it weaves a story around the “hole” that 
metaphor both creates and covers over. This aspect can be regarded as metonymical, or as 
what Lacan calls the (syntagmatic) string of signiﬁers. To the extent that literatureʼs meta-
phorical dimension stimulates an allegorical reading (and thus forgets and disrespects the 
exceptional), the fate of the singular could be said to be tied up with the metonymical. A 
storyʼs metonymical dimension testiﬁes to the selﬂessness of the literary “object.”
 There is of course a general consensus that literature is not a “container” of ideas, 
moral lessons, or commentaries on existing political situations. We all realize that to un-




is a consensus about what literature is not, it has proved more difﬁcult to reach unanimity 
about what it is. Derek Attridgeʼs recent and forceful attempts to determine what he has 
called literatureʼs singularity may serve as a good basis to demonstrate this difﬁculty. 
Attridge has argued for a type of reading that does not reduce literature to an allegory 
of meaning. Literature is not something that simply exists—waiting for a theoretician 
who will use it as an illustration or for a reader who will only understand what he or she 
already knows—but is an event, something that brings something new into a given situ-
ation. This singularity does not turn literature into something that is altogether irrelevant 
for theory. On the contrary, precisely because it escapes, or at least resists, interpretive 
schemes, literature forces the reader to question them. 
 Although we share Attridgeʼs suspicion of allegorical modes of reading, we question 
his nonallegorical alternative, in particular as he elaborates it with regard to Coetzee. The 
problem, as we see it, is that this alternative relies heavily on a process of identiﬁcation 
between readers and protagonists that actually amounts to a variation on the allegorical 
theme. In Gilles Deleuzeʼs reading of Melvilleʼs Bartleby we ﬁnd the building blocks of 
what we regard as a more persuasive nonallegorical alternative, that of readers  ʼsyntag-
matic participation in the text rather than paradigmatic identiﬁcation with protagonists.
 In the ﬁrst part of this essay we examine a reading that refuses to be allegorical, only 
to ﬁnd itself elaborating what amounts to a superallegory of the paradigmatically human 
with which readers must identify. We counter this threat by drawing attention to what we 
see as the readerʼs syntagmatic participation in the text—a process that inevitably relies 
on allegorical modes of interpretation, and that does not deny the dissemination typical of 
literature. A metonymical reading of this type takes place in the absence of a metaphorical 
identity. Both Bartleby and Life and Times of Michael K take the reader to the point of 
“nakedness” or the absence of particular features— “I am not particular,” Bartleby says. 
In order to begin to conceptualize this sort of dispersed and constantly moving literary 
life, the ﬁnal part of the essay turns to Deleuze.
1
In J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, Derek Attridge points out that Coetzeeʼs 
novels have produced a plethora of allegorical readings. The presence of enigmatic char-
acters like Michael K and the lack of a precise context in which they appear seems to 
have prompted reader upon reader to look for a hidden signiﬁcance beneath the surface 
of the text. His chapter on Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K 
argues against such an allegorizing impulse, by showing up the limitations both of the 
attempt to look for universal truths about “the human condition” and of the desire to un-
earth references to speciﬁc South African situations. In either case one takes the text to be 
telling more and something different than what can be concluded from a “superﬁcial” or 
what Attridge calls a literal or literary reading. The chapter is suitably entitled “Against 
Allegory.”
 Attridgeʼs major argument is that when we talk, write, or teach about literature, we 
shift into a mode that fails to do justice to the event of reading literature, an event that 
upon each repetition is slightly different, that arises in the interaction between reader and 
text, and is thus inevitably interimplicated with the history that exists beyond the text. It 
is in making the latter point that Attridge distinguishes his take most clearly from that of 
liberal humanists or New Critics. He wants “a close reading that takes account of [sub-
sequent] developments, including an openness to alterity, an acknowledgment of the his-
torical and cultural situatedness of both writing and reading, a responsiveness to the work 
as invention, a sensitivity to the mediations through which we experience the world, and 
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a registering of the event of the text in a performance of its own stagings of languageʼs 
multiple powers” [Attridge, J. M. Coetzee 62]. Here Attridge zooms in on two passages 
from Waiting for the Barbarians, one that is thematically pivotal, and another that is not. 
For both he tries to offer a nonallegorical reading.
 In the ﬁrst case, this is arguably more difﬁcult to do. The passage is located at the 
point when “the barbarian girl, partially blinded by her torturers, has been left behind in 
the town as a beggar, and the Magistrate has brought her into his apartment” [43]. An al-
legorical account of the passage, Attridge suggests, 
would probably focus on the fact that this is one of many passages that signal 
the novel sʼ insistence on the self-deceptions of the liberal conscience, in [sic] 
the thinness of the dividing line between overt repression achieved by violent 
methods and the subtler forms of oppression produced by laissez-faire attitudes, 
the pursuit of personal gratiﬁcations, and an unwillingness to rock the boat. 
The fascination with the body that characterizes erotic attachment cannot, the 
novel tells us, be separated from the fascination of the body evident in the torture 
chamber. [43]
 
While Attridge regards such observations as quite valid, he exclaims about how far they 
fall short of “the experience of reading the passage, especially in the context of the novel” 
[43]. And he registers regret over the fact that there does not seem to be a “critical vo-
cabulary that will do justice to the multiple, simultaneous, changing effects of a pas-
sage like this” [44]. All he can try to do is “present in somewhat prosaic terms a few of 
the events—intellectual, affective, and physical—that may occur in an engaged reading” 
[44]. What is striking about what follows is the extent to which Attridge highlights a con-
tinuity between the readerʼs experience and the protagonistʼs. In the very ﬁrst sentence of 
his presentation, he points out that, “[e]ncouraged by the present tense and ﬁrst person, 
we undergo, along with the Magistrate, the complex unfolding of feelings and associa-
tions” [44]. “We sense his own awareness that he is playing out the standard rituals of 
seduction,” Attridge notes next: “We are conscious—as he is—of a history of sexual 
exploitation” that lies behind this scene. “But the denial that follows (ʻThis is not what 
you think it isʼ): is this the standard seducerʼs lie? Yes and no . . . Neither the Magistrate 
nor the reader knows.” 
 Something rather strange is happening by this point. We have seen Attridge deplore 
what gets lost when a reading is merely allegorical—when it uses the literal only as a 
means of access to a rational, often underlying, meaning: we have seen him critique the 
ﬂattening tendency that universalizes the meaning of literary works as emblems of the 
human condition; we have seen him question the obverse movement whereby a literary 
text becomes merely typical of its speciﬁc place and time. But in the alternative Attridge 
proposes, readers are, surprisingly, supposed to resist either of these two basic allegoriz-
ing moves by, in effect, undertaking a third, in which they themselves become ﬂattened 
out for the moment of the reading, completely identifying with the Magistrate, wholly 
sharing his experience, allowing what happens to him to happen to them: “the sudden 
vulnerability of the [barbarian girlʼs] exposed throat, the surge of erotic attraction, the ob-
scurity of the impulses that make themselves known—these are elements in the readerʼs 
experience as well as the Magistrateʼs. And that complex of feelings, that momentary 
complicity with something dark and destructive, as something that happens to the reader, 
is more signiﬁcant testimony to the power and distinctiveness of literature, and to the bril-
liance of Coetzeeʼs art, than any extracted moral about the errors of liberal humanism” 
[45]. That there is something strained about Attridgeʼs proposed solution to the problem 
of allegorical reading becomes further apparent when he insists, on the one hand, that in 
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the type of literal reading he is advocating the text “comes into being only in the process 
of understanding and responding that I, as an individual reader in a speciﬁc time and 
place, conditioned by a speciﬁc history, go through” [39], while suggesting, on the other 
hand, that if there is “no guarantee” that his reading of the passage about the barbarian girl 
“coincides with the way anyone else experiences this passage . . . [,] after many conversa-
tions about Coetzeeʼs ﬁction, after reading many responses to it, I know thereʼs a good 
chance that others have experienced something like this . . .” [45]. It is, to say the least, 
curious that an argument which subjects allegorical reading to critical scrutiny on the 
basis of its universalizing and localizing effects—which are thought, cogently enough, to 
deny the singularity of literature—ends up inviting the reader into the text on a basis that 
is both universalizing (we have all experienced something like this) and localizing (this 
type of reading can only ever be a temporally and geographically unique event). 
 As we see it, the key problem with Attridgeʼs way of defending the singularity of 
literature from the detrimental effects of various types of allegorizing is that it insists on 
a process of identiﬁcation between reader and protagonist, and that it is less than obvious 
how such identiﬁcation is supposed to promote in the reader that singular “openness to 
alterity” that Attridge so highlights in explicating how his type of close reading differs 
from traditional versions. Take his account of the second scene from the Barbarians he 
zooms in on, a passage that is not thematically pivotal, but instead describes time passing, 
as the Magistrate “stare[s] out over the square where the wind chases ﬂurries of dust. Two 
little boys are playing with a hoop. They bowl it into the wind. It rolls forward, slows, 
teeters, rides back, falls. The boys lift their faces and run after it, the hair whipped back 
from their clean brows” [Barbarians 27, qtd. in Attridge 46]. Attridge, quite persuasively, 
argues that the importance of a passage such as this is missed in the type of allegorical 
interpretation whose poverty he wants to expose. “To allegorize is to translate the tempo-
ral and the sequential into the schematic: a set of truths, a familiar historical scene” [46]. 
What happens here, he says, is that readers “sense . . . the passing of time not just as a fact 
enunciated but an experience lived through” [46]. Fair enough. But is it necessary to elide 
the difference between reader and protagonist quite as starkly as to go on to write that we 
experience “both the emptiness of a day without further contact with the girl, about whom 
we and our alter ego in the ﬁction have many more questions to ask, and the feeling of 
seasonal change so important in the novel . . .” [46, emphasis added]? Or to conclude this 
section by noting that “the inability to draw any more speciﬁc conclusion is experienced 
both by the Magistrate . . . and by the reader” [47]? Such a stress on the seamless continu-
ity between “hero” and reader forms an odd juxtaposition to the “sensitivity to the media-
tions through which we experience the world” that Attridge calls for when he summarizes 
the nature of a reading that would be respectful of the singularity of literature [62]. What 
happens to the mediation that is the Magistrate when we are completely oblivious to his 
presence and see the world of the barbarian girl through his/our eyes only?
 The limitations of Attridgeʼs alternative to allegorical reading become even more ap-
parent when he turns to Life and Times of Michael K. Now it is K with whom the reader 
is supposed to identify so that the event of Attridgeʼs literal reading might take place. 
[I]t is important to stress that the reading experience that I am trying to describe 
is one of continuous engagement, of the texture of a singular consciousness 
sustained with remarkable consistency. (This is why the medical ofﬁcer sʼ section 
of Michael K hits us with such a shock when we reach it—though it too quickly 
engages us with a contrasting consciousness.) Sentences that grip, tantalize, or 
explode occur on every page, not as exercises in ﬁne writing but as invitations 
to apprehend ways of being outside, but highly relevant to, the comfortable pat-







There is much in this sketch that we would subscribe to. The ﬁnal characterization in 
particular expresses well what a form of reading might look like that respects the sin-
gularity of literature while seeking to ﬁnd in it ways of apprehending alterity. But why 
is it necessary to insist on the idea that such an effect can only result from a process of 
engaging with one vessel of consciousness (or two)? Why must an account of literature 
that would subvert the dominance of the allegorical—of that meaning-seeking impulse 
that substitutes various forms of the familiar for the true foreignness of the literary text 
and its superﬁcial texture—why must such an account substitute a continuity between the 
readerʼs (familiar) consciousness and that of one or more characters for an apprehension 
of the latterʼs otherness? 
 We agree wholeheartedly with Attridge that the singularity of literature demands a 
“responsive reading, an immersion in the text” so that we “participate in, and perhaps are 
changed by, this complex understanding of hope and fear, illusion and disillusionment,” 
as he puts it in summing up his literal/literary reading of Barbarians. But we feel we must 
disagree, just as unequivocally, with Attridgeʼs assumption that a responsive reading and 
an immersion of this type require an identiﬁcation between the reader and a central char-
acter—that they rely upon our ability to place ourselves in some sort of continuity with 
the consciousness of a protagonist. Such an understanding of the relation between reader 
and character seems peculiarly metaphorical, foregrounding as it does a willingness to 
think of oneself as interchangeable with one or another protagonist—to elide, for the time 
of the reading, any real differences between oneself and that protagonist, just as a meta-
phor, when successful, creates the illusion of an identity between tenor and vehicle on 
the basis of a (selective) ground that is accepted for the duration of the ﬁgure of speech. 
The parallel is peculiar because, before the late eighteenth century attempted to impose a 
stringent distinction between the two, allegory was regarded as simply an extended form 
of metaphor, a point of view that has never gone completely away (cf. Rosamund Tuveʼs 
dictum that “Allegoria does not use metaphor; it is one”)3 and that has, of late, enjoyed a 
remarkable resurgence: “The earlier rhetorical tradition saw allegory, correctly, as part of 
the natural continuum of metaphorical expression.”4 Both allegory and metaphor derive 
from a fundamental paradigmatic impulse, which specializes in ﬁnding similarity in spite 
of difference, differences in spite of similarities. Seen in this light, Attridge cannot escape 
from the allegorizing/metaphorizing tendency that he is aiming to expose in his account 
of the singularity of literature. He cannot do so because, if he tropologically classiﬁes the 
mode of reading he rejects as allegorical, he does not adequately consider what the tro-
pological classiﬁcation would be of the alternative he proposes. In insisting so heavily on 
what strikes us as an implicitly metaphorical continuity between readers and protagonists, 
Attridge misses an opportunity to realize the full potential of his challenge to allegorizing 
readings. 
 In our view, Attridgeʼs account of the singularity of the literary text is at its most suc-
cessful when it highlights aspects of a novel like Life and Times to which our relationship 
as readers is, in tropological terms, metonymical rather than metaphorical, in structuralist 
terms: syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic. Such aspects are well summarized by him as 
“the rich and sometimes apparently quite contingent details of the text” [48], “the air we 
breathe while we are absorbing the words” [59]. They include the “powerful physical de-
pictions” that he foregrounds, for instance in the passage from Barbarians that we quoted 
here [48]. We share Attridgeʼs sense that these are “some of the qualities of the novel that 
are unaccounted for by an allegorical reading [that wants] to move to parallels outside the 
world of the book” [48]. But we would argue that “all of these attributes” [48] constitute 
the syntagmatic hooks that enable readers  ʼeyes to become attached to a narrative without 
needing to identify paradigmatically with any one character in particular. If readers are 
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truly to do justice to the singularity of literature as Attridge quite rightly argues they ought 
to, then they should ﬁnd a means of relating to the text rather than identifying with the 
dominant consciousness at any given point of the text. 
 In his account of Life and Times of Michael K Attridge regularly notes the many ways 
in which this novel resists any easy identiﬁcation between the reader and the eponymous 
character. But his overall perspective ﬁrmly remains that, if this resistance makes it im-
possible to derive an “ethical lesson from Kʼs condition,” we can still “return from living 
through it in a reading to the world of obligation, to that ʻother time  ʼwhich is ours, with a 
changed sense of its status” [56]. The act of reading, here and elsewhere, is presented as a 
“living through” the protagonistʼs “condition.” It is only by leaving our own time, enter-
ing into that “ʻother time,ʼ” it is only by exchanging, for the duration of the reading, our 
own self for that of K that we will be able to return to our own time and self in an altered 
fashion.5 This is certainly a tantalizing perspective. It speaks to the romantic sense of the 
transformative effect of literature. But it is seriously ﬂawed both as an account of what 
reading Life and Times is actually like and as a way of explaining the singularity of litera-
ture. Attridge is too good a close reader not to be seduced into observations that actually 
undercut the thrust of his identiﬁcatory-transformative account of the relation between 
reader and character. One of the ﬁrst peculiarities of Life and Times that he notes is that it 
does not just avoid ﬁrst-person narration but also “makes only intermittent use of free in-
direct discourse, the technical device apparently most suited to conveying an individualʼs 
inner world while remaining in the third person . . .” [49–50]. In this way, Coetzee is 
said “to sustain throughout the ﬁction the otherness of Kʼs responses: although we learn 
in moving detail of his thought-processes and emotions, we never feel that we have as-
similated them to our own” [50]. Exactly. But why doesnʼt Attridgeʼs theoretical account 
of the relation between reader and ﬁction leave any clear space for such an unassimilable 
experience? Why is so little done, structurally, with the entirely apt ﬁnding that there are 
many sentences in this novel “that begin as statements about Kʼs mental world but which 
carry on in language that hardly seems his” [50]? Or with the noted “sense that this is a 
character whom we canʼt easily pretend that we know” [51]? Why is nothing really made 
of the fact that we engage “with Kʼs mental process while registering the strangeness of 
this attitude” [53–54], and that the “rhythm of the clauses, the quasi-philosophical specu-
lation . . . are not Kʼs” [54]? 
 What makes the experience of reading Life and Times a truly singular event is pre-
cisely the fact that we are invited to enter the world inhabited by K, while remaining 
fundamentally unable to share his own experience of that world. The medical ofﬁcerʼs 
attempts at reading K do not merely constitute a warning against the type of allegoriz-
ing reading that Attridge critiques; they also show us the misguidedness of attempting to 
identify with K, as the medical ofﬁcer systematically does. Coetzeeʼs readers do not relate 
paradigmatically to the otherness that the world of the novel presents them with; they try 
instead to relate syntagmatically to that exceptional quality. That is to say, they enter the 
world of the novel as participants in their own right (not as temporary substitutes for one 
of the characters or for the narrative consciousness), who engage in an event of reading, 
not in one of virtual living.
2
In a second move, we wish to turn to Deleuzeʼs reading of Bartleby. This choice was 
prompted by a fairly throwaway suggestion in Hardt and Negriʼs instant classic, Empire, 
that there is a similarity between the characters of Bartleby and Michael K. Though brief, 
the ﬁve paragraphs (in italic font) in which this parallel is touched upon are inserted at a 
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crucial place within the book, namely in between the detailed analysis of the workings of 
empire and a ﬁrst attempt at bringing a counterempire to light [Hardt and Negri 203–04]. 
Under the heading of Refusal the reader is presented with a laudatory account of the two 
characters and their mysterious yet stubborn refusal of what is being offered to them as 
reasonable demands and advice worthy of consideration. Both Bartleby and Michael K 
seem to be guided by preoccupations they cannot communicate, at least not in a way that 
would allow for careful negotiation. As Bartleby and Michael K are so deeply character-
ized by this refusal, they appear as men “without qualities,” as mere men and nothing 
more, situating themselves at the level of naked universality. The authors note that it is 
precisely because of this association with bare and simple being that the case of Bartleby 
has attracted attention from such philosophers as Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze.6
 Despite the sympathy with which Hardt and Negri write about Bartleby and Michael 
K, the reader is immediately warned that their refusal is empty and suicidal. A true libera-
tory politics might originate in a “no” but cannot remain stuck to it. In that sense they 
repeat the basic thesis of Albert Camusʼs Man in Revolt: the opposing “no” on which a 
revolution is based (for instance, against a class society) should be accompanied by an 
afﬁrmation (such as equality), or its only result will be pure destruction. As Hardt and 
Negri put it: “This refusal certainly is the beginning of a liberatory politics, but it is only 
a beginning. The refusal itself is empty. Bartleby and Michael K may be beautiful souls, 
but their being in its absolute purity hangs on the edge of an abyss” [204].
 With Attridgeʼs critique of allegorical reading in mind, we must note that Hardt and 
Negri pay attention only to the allegorical function of these texts and disregard the expe-
rience of reading Coetzeeʼs novel or Melvilleʼs tale, an experience that ideally draws us 
into “unfamiliar emotional and cognitive territory,” as Attridge would put it [43]. Hardt 
and Negriʼs summary of Bartleby and K as “beautiful souls” is precisely the type of al-
legorizing “reminder of what we already know” that Attridge would have us avoid [43]. 
However, Hardt and Negriʼs qualiﬁcation of Bartleby and Michael K as “mere men and 
nothing more” does go some way toward providing a basis for resisting the type of iden-
tiﬁcatory reading that we see as a poor alternative to the allegorical. 
 There is, furthermore, a less accidental ground for reading Bartleby and Michael K 
together. Chapter 2 of Life and Times of Michael K parallels Melvilleʼs tale in one—for 
us, crucial—respect. The medical ofﬁcerʼs diary fragments and notes on his encounter 
with the person he knows as “Michaels” (Michael K) bear a strong resemblance to the 
lawyerʼs report of his experiences with Bartleby. In both cases, what is at stake is an ac-
count of the obstruction that characters such as Bartleby and Michael K constitute for the 
well-meaning attempts at interpretation and action that both the medical ofﬁcer and the 
lawyer undertake. Both are conscious of the fact that they cannot understand this strange, 
resistant presence in their lives. Indeed, their story consists in the very act of reporting on 
this failure to understand. 
 A further parallel between chapter 2 of Life and Times and Bartleby is the ﬁrst-person 
narrative perspective, which, certainly at ﬁrst sight, encourages the reader to identify with 
the narrator (the other two chapters of Life and Times are narrated in the third person and 
mostly use Michael K as a focalizer, to whose thoughts we have only limited access, how-
ever). Indeed, many readers and critics have felt encouraged by this mediated narrative 
situation to develop an allegorical reading of this strange character of Bartleby.7 He has 
been seen variously as a mystical saint, a wayward nihilist, and a rebellious proletarian; 
his story as a biblical parable, the report of a psychoanalytic cure, an allegory of writing, 
and so on. Life and Times explicitly stages this allegorizing tendency, and, in doing so, 
makes us wary of indulging in it, even while we realize that an allegorizing impulse can 
never be completely resisted. The moment in Coetzeeʼs novel where this problem is tack-
led most clearly occurs when the medical ofﬁcer is addressing a letter to “Michaels”—a 
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letter that will remain unsent:
Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if you know that word. It was an 
allegory—speaking at the highest level—of how scandalously, how outrageously 
a meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in it. 
Did you not notice how, whenever I tried to pin you down, you slipped away? I 
noticed. [166]
Reading Bartleby alongside Life and Times is a productive exercise because it helps clar-
ify the issues that surround the seductions of allegorical reading. In particular, Deleuzeʼs 
account of Bartleby is oriented toward an ethics of reading that has a lot of common 
ground with Attridgeʼs plea for the singularity of literature, yet that may assist us in steer-
ing clear of a metaphorical-identiﬁcatory understanding of the relation between reader 
and text that risks being collapsed once more into an allegorical mode.
3
Attridgeʼs antiallegorical argument that we fail to do justice to literature to the extent 
that we look to it merely for reminders “of what we already know” [43] runs parallel to 
Deleuzeʼs insistence that literature constitutes an encounter (rencontre), rather than an act 
of recognition (reconnaître). Deleuze is strongly opposed to any reading that looks for a 
hidden meaning or, in the language of structuralist linguistics, the signiﬁed of a text. This 
kind of reading takes the text to be a box referring to an inside in which something is hid-
den. Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular is, for Deleuze, a perverse or corrupted way 
of reading, for he regards it as even worse to look for the signiﬁer of the text [Deleuze, 
Pourparlers 17]. Leaving aside this heated debate, it is clear that the important place 
literature occupies within Deleuzeʼs work is not due to any desire to track down edifying 
or humanist signiﬁcances whilst reading a novel or a poem.8
 In his “Bartleby; or, The Formula” [68–90] Deleuze decisively dismisses any allego-
rizing reading right from the start: “ʻBartleby  ʼis neither a metaphor for a writer nor the 
symbol of anything whatsoever. It is a violently comical text, and the comical is always 
literal. . . . It means only what it says, literally” [68]. At the center of Deleuzeʼs analysis is 
“what it says”: the infamous formula “I would prefer not to.” This emphasis is in line with 
Deleuzeʼs understanding of texts as material: they are not constructions based on a spe-
ciﬁc (allegorical) meaning, but (literal-material) productions in or through which some-
thing happens. “One considers a book to be an a-signifying machine; the only problem 
is to know whether it functions and how it functions” [Deleuze, Pourparlers 17]. This 
functioning is not the narrative, plot, or sequence of events of which a character is the 
agent or object. Rather, Deleuze focuses on the character as a break with a given order. 
Thus, in Bartleby, the lawyer (and narrator) ends his story with the sigh: “Ah, Bartleby! 
Ah, humanity!,” but we do not need to read this as if Bartleby reveals some universally 
human aspect, which we could all recognize. Bartleby is not the particular concretiza-
tion of a universal, human truth. In the sigh, Bartleby and humanity are juxtaposed and 
the lawyerʼs sigh comments on the strange encounter with someone who could not be 
reduced to “humanity.” The lawyer has survived this encounter but only at the cost of 
choosing against Bartleby and for an already familiar humanity.9 He has, in other words, 
replaced encounter with recognition. Our job as readers, we could speculate (Deleuze 
does not make this point explicit), is to allow the encounter to take place.
 This is not an easy task. If the story of Bartleby and the lawyer is the story of a 
missed encounter, that is in large part because Bartleby is, using a distinction made by 
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Deleuze in his essay on Francis Bacon, a ﬁgure but not ﬁgurative. He is an isolated ﬁgure 
who lacks any bond, be it with fellow men, himself, his past, or his future. He has nothing 
to do with particular conditions like “family” or “education”—he is, indeed, “not particu-
lar”; he lacks all particularity. About Bartleby himself, so the lawyer-narrator tells us right 
from the start, one cannot tell a thing. “He is an irreparable loss to literature.” This ironi-
cal turn is taken seriously by Deleuze. If Bartleby is not a novel, striking, or captivating 
character, this is only because he is a true “original.” Surprisingly, Deleuze—who is well 
known for his theory of the simulacrum, that is, of copies without formative original or 
model—makes a lot of this expression, which he adopts from Melvilleʼs The Conﬁdence-
Man: His Masquerade (1857). In chapter 44 of this novel Melville refers to “originals” 
that are to be differentiated from peculiar or striking characters. A true “original” “is like 
a revolving Drummond light, raying away from itself all round it—everything is lit by 
it, everything starts up to it [. . .] so that, in certain minds, there follows upon adequate 
conception of such a character, an effect, in its way, akin to that which Genesis attends 
upon the beginning of things” [Melville 205]. To the extent that literature loses a striking 
character and a story because of a true originalʼs presence, it gains originality and move-
ment. These “true” originals are neither general nor particular, for they escape established 
knowledge and defy every psychology.10 Even the words they utter exceed the laws of 
language, “since they are like the vestiges or projections of a unique, original language 
[langue], and bring all of language [langage] to the limit of silence and music” [83].
 This language belongs to no one, and it addresses itself to no one in particular. In 
brief, it is a language without a language community. Thus, Bartlebyʼs formula “I would 
prefer not to” introduces a strange logic of preference within a context that is actually 
supposed to be about the giving or receiving of orders. If the formula is perhaps not quite 
agrammatical (Deleuze is of two minds about this [68–69]), its mannered form and its in-
deﬁniteness—what is it that Bartleby would prefer not to do, and what is it he would like 
to do?—drive his boss and colleagues to distraction. What is more, they, too, unwittingly 
start to take up the turn of phrase “prefer to.” When Bartleby repeats his predictable but 
mysterious phrase he leaves his listeners in a state of perplexity. However, if Bartleby is 
in the grips of the formula, he is so in another, more consequential way than his audience. 
The utterance for him is neither an afﬁrmation nor a negation: “he would prefer not to,” 
but not to do . . . what? “The formula is devastating because it eliminates the preferable 
just as mercilessly as any nonpreferred” [71]. Any reference to an object—that is, the task 
or action he does or does not want to do—disappears. According to Deleuze, Bartlebyʼs 
formula carves an alien language within language. It makes language stutter and creates 
“cavities of non-communication.” It drives language to its own border, to an outside that 
is not external to language but immanent to it. What Deleuze means with these cavities of 
noncommunication can be derived from his Logic of Sense, where he invokes stoic logic 
in order to determine what sense is.
 For the Stoics, everything that exists is a body. “Body” is a capacious category that 
also embraces such items as the “soul” or “virtue.” These corporeals interact, operating 
as causes with regard to one another. There is, strictly speaking, nothing outside these 
bodies. Nonetheless, the Stoa leaves room for persistent or insistent effects, the so-called 
uncorporeals that situate themselves at the surface of bodies. An example that Deleuze 
cites is a tree that turns green. The “greening” of the tree is purely a surface phenomenon. 
The treeʼs “greening” or “turning green” is neither an existing quality of the tree, nor 
does it add anything to the treeʼs “being.” Rather, it is a transient effect that cannot be 
caught in any description. This type of “sense effect” or “uncorporeal” is expressed, so 
the Stoics thought, in verbal forms, such as “greening.” These verbs do not refer to states 
of affairs or things, but express what happens, or more precisely what is happening and 
what will therefore never be. That which is, which belongs to the order of “being,” is the 
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bodies. Nouns and adjectives indicate these bodies. What happens, by contrast, belongs 
to the order of becoming and can only be captured by verbs. It is for this reason that the 
Stoics  ʼconcept of time is split into two dimensions: the dimension of things, bodies and 
their attributes, that is, the present time of Chronos, and the dimension of happening and 
becoming, or Aion, the limitless future and past of the uncorporeals.11
 We are now closer to determining what a true Deleuzian encounter between reader 
and text could look like. We have seen how Deleuze discovers a true original in Bartleby 
and how, within a literary universe, language gets affected by Bartlebyʼs formula and 
opens itself up to a new language. As Rancière  observes in The Flesh of Words, Deleuze 
consistently uses musical or affective notions to characterize this new language within 
language. In the case of Sacher-Masoch a murmur can be heard; Isabel (a character from 
Pierre; or, The Ambiguities) produces a hardly audible, angelic whispering; and Gregor 
Samsa squeaks and shrieks. This musical-affective language is not so much located out-
side existing language as it detaches itself from it, just as the sense effect cannot do with-
out corporeal causes but appears as an excess with regard to them. Similarly, Bartlebyʼs 
formula ﬂirts with an agrammatical relation to language and functions within the existing 
grammatical and communicative mode of language as an excessive supplement. It con-
stitutes a cavity of noncommunication, impenetrable to the kind of rational discourse that 
the lawyer employs, and it appears as a persistent and insistent sense effect, constantly in 
the act of happening, without ever touching ﬁrm ground—what is it Bartleby would (not) 
prefer?—instead suspended in an eternal Aion of becoming.
 Thus, in a true encounter, the reader will not see the text “as a locus of meaning that 
awaits interpretation, nor as a point of subjectiﬁcation” [Vrijders 115]. Rather, in a Deleu-
zian ethics of reading, “criticism and ﬁction are no longer separate ﬁelds, but constantly 
exchange affects, undergoing mutual processes of becoming” [Vrijders 115]. Bartlebyʼs 
formula constitutes one such sense effect that stimulates an exchange of affect: it con-
stantly invites and resists interpretation; Michael Kʼs refusal to communicate, to explain 
himself, another. Both characters strongly resist an allegorical reading, and the texts in 
which they appear stage what happens when allegory gets provoked. The tendency to un-
derstand (help, empathize with, . . .) gets obstructed, and this very obstruction carries the 
tendency to its conclusion. Both in Bartleby and in the second chapter of Life and Times, 
the “ﬁgure” disappears, abandoning the ﬁrst-person narrator to his own best intentions: 
the charitable impulse manifested by both narrators is incapable of truly dealing with the 
obstruction thrown up by the ﬁgures. This is because the Bartlebyʼs charity is a way of 
avoiding a genuine exchange of affect. Put differently, such charity amounts to an attempt 
to reduce a character that belongs to the temporal realm of Aion to that of Chronos. In 
both cases this is clear in the emphasis on how poor the diet is on which the original ﬁgure 
subsists, for instance, and on the narrators  ʼattempts to intervene in this respect. 
 Both narrators in this way serve as a warning against an identiﬁcatory mode of read-
ing that proceeds on the basis of readers  ʼaffectively projecting themselves, their needs, 
and their expectations onto protagonists. With Deleuze, we would argue that a genuine 
encounter with the text involves an exchange of affect, rather than the affective projection 
that is implicit in acts of identiﬁcation and which involves a ﬂattening out of the obstacle 
that characters such as Bartleby and Michael K place in our way. Such an exchange can 
only be successful when the textʼs language-within-language is attended to and when 
readers participate syntagmatically in the world of the text, occupying a position of con-
tiguity with regard to protagonists rather than arrogating unto themselves an identity that 
is derived from the latterʼs particularity. Admittedly, the special nature of the protagonists 
that are at the heart of the two works of ﬁction we have examined facilitates such a met-
onymical relationship. In apprehending Bartleby one is brought to the point where it is a 
“mere man” that appears to us, devoid of any identiﬁable characteristics (I am not partic-
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ular). As to Michael K, we saw Attridge note how the narrative perspective makes it dif-
ﬁcult for the reader to enter into Kʼs thoughts and emotions. The bulk of Life and Times, 
moreover, is made up not of the scene of Kʼs conﬁnement to the sick bay at Kenilworth, 
but of his seminomadic existence, setting down only the most tentative of roots in Cape 
Town (especially in the abandoned apartment of the couple his mother used to serve), and 
at Prince Albert (at what may or may not have been the farm his mother grew up on), but 
nowhere achieving a permanent habitat, nowhere settling down to “the” meaning of life. 
Thus, our ability to relate to K is dependent on a willingness to join in his peregrinations, 
not, we would claim, as travelers that follow in his footsteps, let alone as ones that have 
exchanged our own for his, but possibly as ones that try to keep up as best we can with the 
pace he chooses to travel at, observing, witnessing his life and times, opening ourselves 
up to the unsettling effect of such a character and the affective exchange its experiences 
require. This is where the true singularity of literature lies: it creates a world that comes 
alive anew upon each reading by virtue of the fact that each reader can occupy a place of 
his or her own within its realm, bringing to life, on this syntagmatic basis, the dead letters 
and heroes that lurk in its pages. 
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 1. In what follows, we do not engage with any possible distinctions between law, norm, and 
rule, opting instead for “rule” as the most general, or least marked, term.
 2. For the Bataillean notion of the formless see Bois and Krauss.
 3. “Allegoria does not use metaphor; it is one. By deﬁnition a continued metaphor, allegoria 
exhibits the normal relation of concretion to abstraction found in metaphor, in the shape of a series 
of particulars with further meanings. Each such concretion of sensual detail is by virtue of its initial 
base already a metaphor” [Tuve].
 4. See Peter Crisp sʼ abstract.
 5. It may not be a mere detail that Attridge chooses to abbreviate Life and Times of Michael 
K as Michael K, while we ﬁnd ourselves using Life and Times instead.
 6. See Agamben and Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical. See also Badiou, Blanchot, Der-
rida, Rancière, and Žižek.
 7. For an overview and critical account of, on occasion, hilarious interpretations of Bartleby, 
see McCall.
 8. Deleuze himself refers to many literary works and dealt with authors such as a.o. Leopold 
von Sacher Masoch, Henry James, Antonin Artaud, T. E. Lawrence, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Alfred 
Jarry, and, of course, Marcel Proust.
 9. In Life and Times the medical ofﬁcer qualiﬁes Michaels (Michael K) as a universal soul 
[151].
 10. “The life of such an individuality effaces itself to the beneﬁt of the singular life that is 
immanent to a man who no longer has a name and yet cannot be confused with anyone else” [De-
leuze, “Immanence” 5].
 11. Deleuze does not go into the speciﬁc temporality pertaining to the tale sʼ characters. None-
theless, we would note that Turkey and Nippers are subjected to a striking daily rhythm: one works 
hard and strong in the morning but goes into some kind of disruptive overdrive in the afternoon; the 
other arrives in a bad humor but switches to normal in the afternoon. All of this is communicated 
to us by the lawyer who measures and determines this modality of time, Chronos. Would not, in this 
scheme of things, the third copyist, the rebarbative Bartleby, incarnate the pure time of becoming, 
Aion? Does Bartleby incorporate the limitless quality of future and past, while also being as ﬁnite 
as a moment, in this case the meridian moment that separates the morning from the afternoon? 
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